Economic conflicts over the supply of Russian gas to Ukraine, as well as gas transit through its territory to Europe, have arisen periodically since 1993. The essence of the disagreement on gas prices lies in the uncertain position of Ukraine in relation to Russia: whether it is a fraternal country, which can be given certain benefits; whether it is an independent European state, and then gas prices should be calculated by European standards.
Background to the conflict
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly formed independent Ukraine, through whose territory the main gas pipeline passed from Russia to Europe, was at a crossroads: on the one hand, Ukraine became a separate state, free from external control, on the other hand, it was a fraternal country in the post-Soviet space. Hence, Ukraine historically retained incentives for the purchase and transit of natural gas produced in Russia.
However, both Russia and Ukraine chose capitalism as the goal of their subsequent development. Therefore, the realities of a market economy gradually took their toll. Despite the substantial discounts on the supplied natural gas, by 1995 Ukraine had accumulated a very large debt for it in the amount of 1 trillion rubles.
Gazprom announced the suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine, but proposed to solve the problem of Ukrainian debt by transferring part of the property of Ukrainian gas pipeline enterprises.
On March 10, 1995, following the results of the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, a decision was made to continue gas supplies to Ukraine, provided that the Ukrainian side would provide a schedule for paying off gas debts within a month. A debt payment schedule was never provided, however, for political reasons, Ukraine was not disconnected from gas.
After the first maidan
In 2004, the “Orange Revolution” began in Ukraine, during which Ukraine’s aspiration for the European Union was outlined, and anti-Russian (sometimes frankly chauvinist) rhetoric sounded from the lips of both ordinary members of the Maidan and some prominent politicians. Nevertheless, Russia took these changes very restrained.
In March 2005, after the “orange coup”, the new Ukrainian government announced to Gazprom that it was necessary to increase rates on Russian gas transit to Europe through Ukraine. The abolition of preferential rates for gas transit for Russia in essence, this would mean an increase in budget revenues of Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Gazprom agreed to raise the transportation tariff, but in turn linked it with the cancellation of the preferential gas price for Ukraine in the amount of $ 50 and the setting of the average European gas price in the amount of $ 160-170 / thousand. m³.
The Ukrainian government categorically rejected such a proposal, insisting on the extension of the previous preferential regime of gas agreements with Russia. The stubborn intransigence of the Ukrainian side, as well as the not-so-obscured anti-Russian rhetoric, led in December 2005 to toughen Russian requirements. The price of gas increased to $ 230 / thousand. m³.
Then, due to the non-signing of gas supply contracts for the next year, from January 1, 2006, gas supply to the Ukrainian market was stopped. But since the main deliveries of Russian gas to Europe are through gas pipelines in Ukraine, according to the direction of the latter, during the first days of 2006, export gas was disagreement with the Russian side to meet our own needs. This was immediately noticed by European consumers.
On January 4, 2006, Gazprom and the Ukrainian government managed to agree on a gas price of $ 95 per thousand. m³. Such a price was made possible by a mixture of expensive Russian and cheap Turkmen gas. However, after some time, Turkmenistan also presented Ukraine with claims for underpayment.
